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the brakesman and \scton-master should not have been examined as
witnesses, and their declarations, not being made at such time and under
such circumstances as to make them a part of the res gestm, were mere
hearsay.
It is argued, however, that the evidence, if excluded, would not have
changed the verdict of the jury, as the case was clearly made out without
it. It is impossible for this court to estimate the effect which this evi-
dence had on the minds of the jury, and it would be going beyond our
legitimate function to enter upon any such vain speculation.
The court erred in admitting the evidence, and it is our province,
without speculating how the evidence might have affected the minds of
the jury, simply to declare it inadmissible, land, fbr this error of the
court, to reverse the judgment, and to remand the cause to the said Cir-
cuit Court, for a new trial, to be had there in accordance with the prin-
ciples declared in the foregoing opinion.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.1
SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS.
2
ICOURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF MARYLAND.3
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA.'
ACTION. See Contract; Fraud.
Successive Suits for accruing Damages.-For malpractice by a physi-
cian in setting a broken arm, successive suits cannot be brought from
time to time, as damages in the future may be suffered, but the recovery
is once for all, and may embrace prospective as well as accrued damages:
Iocell v. Goodrich, 69 Ill.
AGENT.
117at is necessary to make the act of an Agent done without authority
binding upon his Princial.-To make the a t of an agent, done without
the authority of his principal, binding upon the latter, it is necessary to
show that le subsequently ratified and adopted the act; and to make
such ratification and ad6ption effectual as against the principal, it must
be shown that he had previous knowledge of all the material facts; and
if he assented while ignorant of those facts, he is at liberty to disaffirm
the transaction when informed of them: Bannon v. Warfield, 42 Ald.
Where an agent lends the money of his principal upon a security which
proves to be insufficient, the judgment of such agent as to the value of
the security at the time it was taken is not conclusive ; evidence may
be introduced, as reflecting on the question of the want of good faith
and reasonable care in making the loan and taking the security, to show
1 From Hon. N . L. Freeman, Reporter; to appear in 69 Illinois Reports.
2 From lion. W. C. Webb, Reporter; to appear in 15 Kansas Reports.
3 From J. Shaaf Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 42 Maryland Rep.
4 From P. Frazer Smitb, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 78 Pa. State Reports.
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that the value of the security was very much less than the estimate
placed thereon by the agent: Id.
Proof of Authority.-While it is competent to prove a parole agency
and its nature and scope by the testimony of the person who claims to
be the agent, and to prove any parol authority by the testimony of the
person who claims to possess such authority ; yet it is not competent to
prove the supposed authority of an agent, for the purpose of binding his
principal, by proving what the supposed agent has said at some previous
time ; nor is it competent to prove a supposed authority of any kind, as
against the person from whom such authority is claimed to have been
received, by proving the previous statements of the person, who, it is
claimed, had obtained such authority: Howe Machine Co. v. Clark, 15
Kans.
ATTORNEY.
Costs and Expense growing out of his Wrongfd Act.-Where an attor-
ney, employed to transact certain business for his client, procures a third
person to be invested with the legal title to property belonging to his
client without any consideration being paid therefor, and the arrange-
ment serving no beneficial purpose to his client, and he afterwards incurs
expense in costs and attorney's fees in getting the legal title in himself
instead of his client, le will have no legal claim to be reimbursed or
allowed for such expenses, on bill for an account by his client against
him: Hughes v. Zeigler, 69 Ill.
AUCTION. See Title.
BAIL3MENT.
Pledge-A security for whole Debt and everypart of it.-In all cases
a pledge is understood to be a security for the whole and for every part
of the debt or engagement, unless it is otherwise stipulated between the
parties. If several things are pledged, each is deemed liable for the
whole debt or other engagement, and the pledgee may proceed to sell
them, from time to time, until the debt or other claim is completely
discharged. If anything perishes by accident or casualty, without his
thult, he has a right over the residue for his whole debt or other duty:
Baldwin v. Bradley, 69 Ills.
COMMON CARRIER.
When Liability of ceases, and that of Warehouseman attaches.-Where
goods have reached their destination either in the night time or on a
Sunday, or where, for any other reason, the consignee is not ready to
receive them on their arrival, and the carrier puts them in store, or in
the charge of competent and careful servants, ready to be delivered when
called for, the carrier's liability as insurer ceases, and he will thereafter
be liable only as warehouseman, and if the goods are destroyed by fire
without fault on his part, he will not be responsible : Rothschild v.
• fich. Central Railroad Co., 69 Ill.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Evidence.
Local Option Laws-Delegation of Le'gislative Power--.rature of a
License to sell Liquor.-Section 1 of the Act of 1874, ch. 453. pro-
vided for an election to be held on the second Tuesday in July 1874,
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
at which the voters of the several election districts in the counties
named, should cast ballots "for the sale of spirituous or fermented
liquors," or "against the sale of spirituous or fermented liquors;"
and directed the judges of election should make return of the votes
to the judges of the Circuit Court, who should make proclamation of'
the result. Section 2 enacted that if it should be found by the
returns of the judges of election, and proclamation of the judges of
the Circuit Court, that a majority of the votes, in any district of
either of the said counties, * * * had been cast against the sale of
spirituous or fermented liquors, that then 'it should not be lawful for
any. person or persons, or body corporate, to sell spirituous or fermented
liquors, in any district of either of said counties voting by a majority
against selling the same. Section 3 prescribed the penalty for
a violation of the act; and section 4 provided that the act should
take effect immediately after it should have been determined by a
majority of the people in any one or more election districts of the
counties named, whether or not spirituous or fermented liquors should
not be sold, as before provided for: hIeld, that this act was constitu-
tional and valid; its going into effect and becoming operative, being
made to depend upon the result of a popular vote, was not a -delegation
of legislative power to the people : Fell v. The State, 42 Md.
The legislature has the undoubted power to prohibit the sale of
spirituous or fermented liquors in any part of the state, notwithstanding
a party to be affected bythe law may have procured a license, under the
general license laws of the state, which has not yet expired. Such a
license is in no sense a contract made by the state with the party hold-
ing the license. It is a mere permit, subject to be modified or annulled
at the pleasure of the legislature, who have the power to change or re-
peal the law under which the license was granted: Id.
CONTEMPT. See Witness.
CONTRACT.
Action-Midutal Mistake-Rescission.-Government bonds were de-
posited in a bank; the depositor alleged that the bank bought them
from him at par, fraudulently informing him that there was no premium
on them, when there was, within the knowledge of the bank. The
depositor sued the bank for the premium and declared in the common
money counts : RIeld, that the depositor could not recover on those
counts: Sankey's Executors v. First Nat. Bank of Mifflinbury, 78 Pa.
If the bonds were purchased by the bank in good faith at par, al-
though they were then selling in the market at a premn.um, of which
both parties were ignorant, the depositor could not, on the ground of
mutual mistake, recover the bonds or the premium on them : Id.
The mistake or ignorance of the parties as to the premium was not
of the essence of the contract, and did not avoid the sale: id.
Rescission- Contagious .Disease.-D. leased to M. for. one year all the
arable land on the farm on which D. then resided. D., on his part, was
to furnish everything and board M. for the year at his house. M., on
his part, was to perform all the labor in raising the crops on said land.
D. was then to have two-thirds of each crop raised on said land and M.
one-third thereof. At the time said lease was entered into, and subse-
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
quently theretu, M. was "infected with a loathsome, contagious and in-
fectious disease, to wit, syphilis," which disease afterwards, and at the
time M. boarded at the house of D., endangered the lives and health of
D. and his family, &c.; of which disease D. was at the tine he entered
into said lease ignorant. In tea days after the lease was entered into,
and when D. became aware of said disease, he refused to board M. any
longer at his house. M. then left the premises and sued D. for damages,
claiming (at least on the trial) as damages the value of the use of said
land for one year and the value of his board for one year. D., as a
defence to said action, offered to show (both by his pleadings and evi-
dence) that D1. was affected with said disease; that he. D., was ignorant
of the same at the time lie entered into said lease; and that he refused
to board M. at his house because of said disease, but the court excluded
said defence: Held, that this was error: Douglas v. McFadin, 15 Kans.
DAMAGES. See Action.
DEED.
Construction-Parol Evidence to explain a Written Tstrumnent.-On
appeal from a decree reforming a deed on the ground of mistake, the
true construction of the deed is before the court, as well as the suffi-
ciency of the proof of the mistake: Fiyer v. Patrick, 42 Md.
31. and wife mortgaged to P. a lot and buildings, &e., "and also all
the household and kitchen furniture in the dwelling on said lot, subject
however to the claim of F. thereupon for the unpaid purchase-money for
the portion of said furniture now being delivered." The construction
of this clause being in question upon the contention of F. that all the
furniture ii6 the house was subject to this claim, it was held, that the
extent of F.'s claim could not be definitely ascertained from this clause,
and extrinsic evidence might be admittbd to show what it was : Id.
EVIDENCE. See Agent; Deed.
Power of Legislature over Rdes of-While a legislature may not, by
the mere machinery of rules of evidence, override and set at naught
the restrictions of the constitution, or arbitrarily make conclusive evi-
dence of a fact anything which in the nature of things has no connec-
tion with that fact nor reasonably tends to prove it, yet it may make that
which, according to the ordinary rules of experience, reasonably tends to
prove a fact, conclusive evidence of it : State v. Woodford, 15 Kans.
EQUITY. See .fligkway; Mnicipal Corporations.
Trusts-Unexecuted Contracts.-A court of equity will execute a
trust where there is a valuable consideration ; but if it be voluntary the
legal estate must be put out of the settlor ; the question as to its validity
being whether it was at first perfectly created : Carlart's Appeal 78 Pa.
In general, a court of equity will not enfcree unexecuted voluntary
contracts inter .ivos. but will leave parties to their remedies at law : Id.
The simple avowal by a purchaser at sheriff's sale, whether made at
the time of the purchase or afterward, that the purchase was for another,
will not support the allegation of a trust : Id.
Power signed a paper stating that if he. purchased lands about to be
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sold by the sheriff, he would hold them on specified trusts for creditors
of the defendant in the execution; after his purchase of the land, Held,
under the circumstances of the case, not to create a trust in Power : Id.
Decreeing Cancellation and Delivering of hzstruments.-A chancellor
will not always order an instrument to be delivercd up to be cancelled
when he would refuse specific performance of the contract; he will
leave the parties to their legal remedies : Stewart's Appeal, 78 Pa.
To decree an instrument to be delivered up to be cancelled is a
matter in the sound discretion of the court, and the power should not
be exercised except in a very clear case : -d.
Whenever an instrument exists, which may be vexatiously or injuri-
ously used against a party, after the evidence to impeach it has been
lost, or which may throw a cloud over the title, and he cannot immedi-
ately protect his right by any proceedings at. law, equity will afford
relief by directing the instrument to be delivered up to be cancelled, or
such other decree as justice or the rights of the party may require : Id.
EXECUTION. See Trespass.
FORMER ADJUDICATION. See Action.
FRAUD. See Limitations, Statute of.
4ccount-Bill or Review-Settlement between Guardian and Ward.
--Where an account is asked on the ground of fraud, it is not sufficient
to charge fraud in general terms; particular acts of fraud should be
stated: Marr's Appeal, 78 Pa.
Fraud without damage is no ground for relief at law or in equity:
1(l.
Fraud used in obtaining a decree, being the principal point in issue,
must be established by proof before the propriety of the decree can be
investigated : Id.
A bill of review is never sustained on strict law against equity : L.
A guardian may within a reasonable time be called to file and settle
his account, although lie may have made a settlement with the ward on
his arrival at age: Id.
After a ward has arrived at full age, he may waive his legal rights to
an account and join his guardian in asking for his discharge; and the
court has power to grant it: Id.
Where there was a settlement with the ward, and a release to the
guardian after she came of age, and on the joint application of the ward
and her guardian a decree made discharging the guardian, the decree
could not be vacated without proof of some specific act of fraud in ob-
taining it, or of some injury occasioned by it: rd.
Action, cannot arise from Contract where Plainti depends on Fraud.
-Fisher sold a house to Saylor, agreeing to make good any loss of Saylor
in a resale. Saylor sold for less than he gave. In an action against
Fisher for the difference there was evidence that the sale of Saylor was
collusive and fraudulent. In answer to a point the court charged, if
there was any collusion between Saylor and his vendee in the sale, then
Saylor " cannot recover more than the difference between a fair price
for the house and the amount.paid to Fisher :" Held to be error; the
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fraud would prevent Saylor from maintaining the action: Fisher v.
Saylor, 78 Pa.
Although there were no fraud in the original contract, the foundation
of Saylor's right of action, yet, as the sale by him was a condition pre-
cedent, he was bound to sell in good faith, and if the sale was collusive,
it was fraudulent as to Fisher; it was as if there had been no sale, and
there was no right of action : Id.
If the sale had been honestly made, although for less than the market
value, Saylor could recover the difference between a fair value and the
price paid Fisher : R.
A right of action cannot arise out of a fraudulent contract, nor out of
the fraudulent performance of a condition of the contract : Id.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
Parol Promise-Debt of Agent.-Where K. & W, by a parol agree-
ment with a certain bank, promise that if the bank will cash a certain
draft to be drawn by and in the name of a certain agent of theirs upon
S. L. & Co., that said K. & W will be responsible for its payment,
and afterwards such agent does draw such draft and the said bank cashes
the same, and afterwards said draft is dishonored by said S. L. & Co.:
.Held, that the bank may maintain an action to recover from said K. &
W., on said parol promise, the amount paid out on said draft, with in-




Encroachment on-Injunction-Equity Practice.-The Act of April
28th 1870, fixing and widening the line of Chestnut street, provided that
it should ,1 not interfere with any buildings now erected on the south side
of that street ;" the front of a building was taken down and a new front
erected on the line prescribed by the act; ornamental columns, pilasters,
&c., to the front were extended fifteen inches beyond the line : Ield, that
these were not prohibited by the act: City of Philadeplphia's i peal,
78 Pa.
According to the ordinary course of equity practice, when a case is
heard on bill and answer, the allegations of fict in the answer are ad-
mitted: Id.
In a bill for injunction, if the question is doubtful, it is decisive
against the injunction; chancery will not decree an injunction except
in a clear case of the invasion of a public or private right : Td.
No usage, however long continued, will justify an encroachment upon
a highway; but such cncroachment, to be remedied byinjunction, must
be really an obstruction to the free use of the highway : Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Tralidity of Agreements between-Standard of Proof in such cases-
Burden of Proof-Invalid Gift from 1usband to Wife.-Where articles
of household ftirniture were purchased by a husband in pursuance of
an antecedent agreement with his wife, that he should advance the
money, and she would reimburse him, which she afterwards did, it was
e1',: 1st. Th:lt agreements of this kind between husband and wife,
VOL. XXIV.-40
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when the latter has a separate estate, are valid and binding upon both
parties ; and it" bondfide, and consummated, tie property purchased by
such agency becomes the goods of the wife. 2d. That no higher stand-
ard of proof of such agreements is required than in other civil cases; a
preponderance of evidence being all that is necessary. 3d. That in an
action by the wife to recover damages for the illegal seizure and sale of
said articles of furniture, under an execution against her husband, the
burden of proof was on her to show that they were her separate pro-
perty when so seized and sold : Myers et al. v. King, 42 Md.
A gift from a husband, who is insolvent, to his wife, is in prejudice
of thc rights of his subsisting creditors, and the wife can acquire no
valid title to the same: Id.
INFANT. See Misnomer.
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE. See Tre.pass.
Li MITATIONS, STATUTE OF.
Actions on ground of Franc- What is included under-Pleading.-
Sect. 18 of the code, which provides, among other things, that "an ac-
tion for relief on the ground of fraud," can only be brought within two
years after the cause of action shall have accrued, and that " the cause
of action in such case shall not be deemed to have accrued until the
discovery of the fraud," applies to actions for 'damages founded upon
fraud, as well as to actions for equitable relief founded upon fraud:
Young v. llhittenlhall, 15 Kans.
Where the petition in such a case shows upon its face thar the fraud
upon which the cause of action is founded was consummated more than
two years before the commencement of the action, the plaintiff must
further set forth in his petition that he did not discover the fraud until
within less than two years before the commencement of the action, or
his petition will be held defective on demurrer: AN.
LICENSE. See Constitutional Law.
LOCAL OPTION. See Constitutional Law.
IIALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
Special Damages-Must be declared for-The declaration in an
action for malicious arrest. was general; under it only such general
damages as the law presumes would follow from the arrest could be
recovered : Stanzfild et al. v. Phillips, 78 Pa.
To recover special damages the declaration should set out with par-
ticularity the causes which produced them : Id.
Evidence of special damages can be given only where they have been
properly averred in the declaration: d.
In an action for malicious arrest, under the Act of July 12th 1842,
of the plaintiff, who was a merchant, the court. allowed a witness to be
asked, " in what manner the plaintiff was injured in credit and circum-
stances and to what extent :" Held to be error: Id.
Exemplary or Punitive Damages-Want of Probable Cause.-In an
action for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff is entitled to recover, if it.
appear that the defendant instituted, or caused to be instituted, the
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* prosecution under which the former was arrested, maliciously and with-
out probable cause, and that said prosecution was terminated by the
discharge of the plaintiff before the institution of his action; Mc Wi7l-
liams v. Hoban, 42 Md.
If, in an action for malicious prosecution, the jury find for the plain-
tiff, they are at liberty to take into consideration all the circumstances
of the case, and to award such damages as will not only compensate the
plaintiff for the wrong and indignity he has sustained in consequence
of the defendant's wrongful act, but may also award exemplary or
punitive damages as a punishment to the defendant for such act: 1(l
In an action for malicious prosecution, the court may properly in-
struct the jury, that if they find that there were no circumstances con-
nected with the transaction out of which the prosecution arose, which
would warrant a reasonable, dispassionate man in believing the plaintiff
to have been guilty of the charge made against him, and in undertaking
such prosecution from public motives, then there was no probable cause
for the prosecution, and the jury may infer, in the absence of sufficient
proof to satisfy them to the contrary, that such prosecution was mali-
cious in law: Id.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
Liability of Master for iihjury to Servant-Duty of Master to furnish
proper Machinery, &c.-:-It is the duty of every employer to exercise rea-
sonable care in providing his laborers with safe machinery, suitable tools
and appliances, adapted to the uses for which they are designed : MH1lan
v. Philadelphia and Southern MHail Steamship Co., 78 Pa.
Where a master places the entire charge of his business, or a distinct
branch of it, in the hands of an agent, exercising no discretion and no
oversight, the neglect by the agent of ordinary care in supplying and
maintaining suitable instrumentalities, is a breach of duty for which the
master is liable: Id.
The risk which a laborer assumes of injury from the neglect of his
fellow, is when they are co-operating in the same business, so that he
knows that the employment is one of the incidents of their common
service: Id.
The plaintiff was engaged as a laborer, under a stevedore employed by
the ship-owner, in unloading a vessel; the rope by which the load was
raised was one that had been spliced by the mate before the arrival of
the vessel at port, and was used as a "single fall," which was more liable
to part than a "double fall." Whilst raising a cask, the rope parted at
the splice, the cask fell and injured the plaintiff. Whether the steve-
dore was a fellow-workman of the plaintiff, and whether the negligence
of the mate in splicing the rope was a risk assumed by the plaintiff,
were, under the circumstances, for the jury : Id.
It was proper for plaintiff to ask of a witness if, at or immediately
after the accident, he heard the stevedore say anything concerning the
rope or its insufficiency : Id.
MISNOMER.
Party served by wi-ong .ame, though an Infant, bound by.-Where
the real party in interest and the one intended to be sued is actmlly
served with process in the cause, even though under a wrong name, he
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must take advantage of the misnomer by plea in'abatement in such suit,
and if he does not he will be concluded by the judgment or decree ren-
dered, the same as if he were described by his true name. And this
rule applies as well to infant as adult deiendants : Pond v. Ennis, 69.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
Title and control of Streets-Efminent Domain-Interference of Court
of Eqnitt.-The corporate authorities of a city bold the public streets
in trust for the use of the public. Where! the municipality possesses
the fee in such streets, although in trust for public uses, it may main-
tain ejeetment against any one who wrongfully intrudes upon, or occu-
pies, or detains the property. Where the adjoining proprietor retains
the fee, the right to the possession, use and control of the street by the
municipality is regarded as a legal and not a mere equitable right:
City of Chicago V. Iftight, 69 Ill.
Equity has no power to enjoin the exercise of the police powers given
by law to the officers of a municipal corporation, so as to prevent such
officers from preserving the public peace, and from keeping a public
street open to public use. The court has no jurisdiction to interfere
with the public duties of any of the departments of the government, or
override the policy of the state: Id.
Where a court of equity, by decree, stayed the hands of the corporate
authorities of a city and the police power to enable a party to take
forcible possession of a public street, and provided that. after he had
closed up the same the city should be forever enjoined from opening or
attempting to open the same, for public use I it was held to be an unwar-
rantable attempt to interfere with the exercise of the right of eminent
domain, on the part. of the city, which was a political question of expedi-
ency, and not a judicial one: Id.
NEGLIGENCE. See Master and Servant.
Rule as to comrparative.-The rule adhered to by this court is, that
negligence in the plaintiff which may have contributed to the injury
will not prevent a recovery, when it is slight as compared with the neg-
ligence of the defendant. An instruction' that the jury may find for
the plaintiff, unless his negligence was equal to or greater than that of
defendant, is not the law, and therefore erroneous : llinois Central Rail-




Liability of Firm for Tort of one partner.-The rule is, that partners
are liable .in solido for the torts of one, if the tort is committed by him
as a partner, and in the course of the partnership business : Loomis v.
Barker, 69 Ill.
Share in Profits, when part of Compensation, does not create.-The
fact that a party selling goods, &c., is to receive a portion of the net
profits on sales, does not make him a partner with the owner, if they are
given merely as a part of his compensation: Burton v. Goodspeed, 69
Ill.
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Separate Issues it Action for Account--Duties of Partners to each
other.-In an action brought by one partner against his copartner for
an accounting in which the answer, while admitting the partnership,
denies the terms as alleged in the petition, and, as a second defence,
claims damages for certain breaches by the plaintiff of the partnership
contract, it is not error for the court to submit to one jury the ques-
tion of the terms and duration of the partnership, then to refer to .1
referee to state and report the account between the partners, and finally
to submit to a second jury the claims for damages: Carlin v. Donegan,
15 Kans.
A petition in an action by one partner against another, which alleges
the partnership, gives a copy of the written contract thcrefbr, alleges
that the plaintiff at the outset paid in a certain specified amount, that
the partnership was terminated, and that during its existence plaintiff
had paid on account of debts and expenses a large sum, and that upon
a settlement of the partnership accounts, which the plaintiff had vainly
sought, a large sum would be found due the plaintiff, and which shows
that the partnership owned a large number of chattels and involved a
series of transactions, states a cause of action and must be held good as
against any objection that can be raised by demurrer, notwithstanding
it does not in terms allege that defendant had possession of any of the
partnership property, or- that he had any accounts to render : Id.
The obligation of one partner to another in the management of the
partnership business is the exercise of good faith and of ordinary care
and prudence, and if loss happens through the ordinary negligence of
a partner, he must bear the loss : Id.
REMOVAL O' CAUSES.
Stay of Proceeding during pendency of Miotion for-Oath not made
hiyparty.-Where an application of the plaintiff is pending in a district
court of the state, to remove the action into the United States Circuit
Court, and the hearing of the application is set by the court for a par-
ticular day in the future, it is error for the court to allow the defendant,
before that day arrives, and in the absence of the plaintiff and his
attorneys, and without any notice to them, to take judgment against the
plaintiff, although, upon the pleadings, the defendant is entitled to just
such a judgment as lie obtained. But where said application is defec-
tive, and ought to be overruled, and is eventually overruled, and where
the plaintiff, who is in default for want of a reply, afterwards moves
the court tb vacate said judgment, but does not offer to file a reply. and
makes no such showing as would entitle him to file a reply, and where
the judgment is correct upon the pleadings in the absence of a reply,
and the court overrules the motion to vacate the judgment: teld, that
the error of the court in rendering the judgment is now immaterial, and
therefore the judgment will not be disturbed: Cooper v. Condon et al.,
15 Kans.
:Where an application, under the Act of Congress of May 2d 1867
(United States at Large 559), is made by the plaintiff, to remove an
action from a district court of the state to the United States Circuit
Court, and the plaintiff himself does not "make and file" any affidavit,
nor is there any reason given why lie does not do so, but his attorney
and agent makes and files the affidavit to sustain said application, and
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
states therein that the attorney and agent, and not the plaintiff, "has
reason to and does believe" that the plaintiff cannot obtain justice in
such state court, &c.: fleld, that the application is not founded upon
a sufficient affidavit. The plaintiff himself slquld make the affidavit: Id.
SALE.
Warranty-Rescission--Fraud7-Evidenice--Return of the Goods.-
The defendant sold plaiuitiff a horse, warranting it sound, the eyes being
then sore : evidence of the condition of the leyes a year afterwards was
admissible for the purpose of showing that the disease was not temporary,
but permanent: Preyman v. Knecht, 78 Pa.
Evidence of the condition of the eyes a year after the sale was not
admissible per se to show that they were diseased at the time of. the
sale; it should not have been received without evidence to show what
was their condition during the intermediate time : Id.
The plaintiff, alleging that the warranty haI been broken, returned the
horse, the defendant refused to receive it, and it was sold as a stray for
about the price plaintiff paid: Held, that evidence of these facts was
admissible : Id.
The horse or its value was the property of the plaintiff, and the de-
fendant might show the price for which it was sold as a stray, as evidence
of the value at the sale to the plaintiff: Id.
If the defendant was guilty of fraud in the sale and wrranty of the
horse, the plaintiff might rescind, and, on returning or offering to return
it, recover back the price paid in case for deceit, or in assumpsit or case
for the fraudulent warranty: Id.
If there were no fraud the plaintiff could pot rescind the contract for
breach of waianty and return the horse tithout defendant's consent:
Id.
He might sue either in case or assumpsit for breach of warranty,
and the measure of damages would be, not: the consideration, but the
difference between the actual value and the value, if sound, with inter-
est from the sale : Id.
Where there is a warranty and no fraud or agreement Io return, the
vendee cannot rescind the contract after it has been executed ; his only
remedy is on the warranty: Id. .-.- -
SET-OFF.
Unliquidated Damages.-In this state any cause of action arising
from contract, whether it be for a liquidated] demand or foinLuliquidated
damages, may consititute a set-off, and be pleaded as such in any action
founded upon contract, whether such action be for a liquidated demand
or for unliquidated damages: Stevens v. Able, .15 Kans.
STATUTE.
Use of Bord in same sense in Different Statutes.-Whenever a legis-
lature has used a word in a statute in one sense and with one meaning,
and subsequently uses the same word in legislation on the same subject-
matter, it will be un.derstood as using it in the same sense., unless there
be something in the context or the nature of things to indicate that it
intended a different meaning thereby: State v Woodford, 15 Kans.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
TITLE.
Personal Property.-Davis deposited a piano for storage with Kirby,
who bought and sold second-hand furniture at auction and received goods
on storage; Kirby had *he piano sold at an auction store; Quinn
bought it bonilfide at a fair sale, without knowing who was its owner:
Held, that Davis could recover the piano from Quinn : Quinn v. Davis,
78 Pa.
The owner of a chattel cannot., apart from legal process, be divested
of his title to it, except through some unlawful or improvident act of his
own. The transfer of )ssession to another without more is not such
act: Id.
The transfer must be accipanied by something indicating in the cus-
todian a right of property or power of alienation; there must be proof,
of language or conduct at least equivocal : .d.
TRESPASS.
Offcer-Execution from Justice of the Peace.-An execution which
recites a judgment only against B, and is issued upon a judgment only
against B, is no protection to an officer in levying upon the property of
A., although it commands him to seize the property of A.: Tie Wilton
Town Company v. Hunphlrey, 15 Kaus.
If a claim sued on before a justice of the peace is a claim against a
corporation, service made upon and defence made by the corporation,
and judgment in fact rendered against the corporation, such proceedings
will nQt be vitiated by a mere mis-recitation of the name of the corpora-
tion: Id.
Great allowance must be made in the proceedings of justices of the
peace for their ignorance-of legal phraseology and their want of famili-
arity with the requirements of judicial proceedings, ad if from the
record can be gathered what the magistrate intended to do and decide,
and there is that which, however irregularly and inartificially prepared,
can be cdnstrued into an expression of that intention, the record will be
upheld as a sufficient recod9f the intended act and deeisioa: Id.
TRUSTS. See Equity.
WITNESS.
Uompetency-Agent-Deth of Agent-Determination of ConTpe-
tency.-Where a firm through an agent enters into a contract, the person
with whom the contract is made, o his suit against the firm for a breach
of the contract, is a competent witness, although the agent be dead
Act of 1868, ch. 116; Spencer v. Trafford, 42 Md.
A firm through its agent L. S. entered into a contract with T., who
sued for a breach of the contract. At the tiial T., the plaintiff, testified
that L. S. was dead. Thereupon the defendant offered to prove by H.
S., one of the defendants, that L. S. was a member of the firm and bene-
ficially interested in the contract, for the purpose of impeaching T.'s
competency as a witness: Ac of 1868, ch. 116. The plaintiff objected
on the ground that 1. S. was not a competent witness: Reld, that H.
S. was a competent witness to prove that L. S; was a member of the
firm: Nd.
Tn civil cases, where the question of the competency of a witness is
one of fact, the court can refer the question to the jury : Id.
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Rile fals,,s in ,to, &c.-Provnce of Jnry as to Credibility.-The
court below instructed the jury as follows: "If you should be satisfied
that any witness in this case has wilfully and corruptly testified fhlsely,
to any material fact, then it is your duty to disregard the whole of the
testimony of such witness :" 1eld, that such instruction is erroneous,
although supported by the decision made in the case of the State v.
Camp ell, 8 Kans. 488, and other cases following that case; also 1144,
that it is the province of the jury to determine the credibility of wit.
nesses and the weight of their testimony; that where any witness has
testified wilfully, corruptly and falsely, to any material fact, it is the
province of the jury to determine how much, or whether the whole of
his testimony should be disregarded, and that no inflexible rule of law
should be interposed between the witness and the jury commanding the
jury to take all or to exclude all of his testimony: Shellenbarger v.
Nufihs, 15 Kans.
Control of Court over Presence of-Exclusion of Testimony for Mis-
condulct-RihlLts of Party- Contempt.-Where the court makes an order
excluding from the court room during the trial all witnesses except such
witness as may at any time be called in for examination, it is the duty
of all witnesses to obey such order, and any person violating the order
may be punished therefor. ]3ut where a witness does violate the order,
it is error for the court to exclude his testimony simply because of such
violation, over the objections and exceptions of an innocent party to the
case who desires to examine the witness: Davenport v. Ogg, 15 Kans.
The testimony of the witness should be received in such a case and
should go to the jury, but the conduct of the witness may also be shown
to the jury for the purpose of affecting his credibility : Id.
Where there is nothing ia the record tending to show that the party
desiring to examine the witness participated in the guilt of the witness,
it will be presumed by the Supreme Court that such party was inno-
cent: Id.
Where the testimony of a witness is excluded because it is supposed
that the witness is incompetent, it will be presumed, in the absence of
anything to the contrary, by the Supreme Court, if the witness is found
to be competent, that the party offering imr was prejudiced by the ex-
clusion, although the testimony of the witness may not be set out in the
record. The rule seems to be this : Where the court below excludes
evidence because the evidence and not the witness is supposed to be in-
competent, the record must contain the evidence sought to be introduced,
so that the appellate court may see whether it is competent or not ; but.
where the court below excludes the witness because the witness and not
his evidence is supposed to be incompetent, then all that is necessary to
put in the record is enough to show whether the witness is competent
or not: Id.
And where the competency of a witness is objected to for any par-
ticular reason it will be presumed by the Supreme Court, unless the
contrary appears, that no other ground for his exclusion exists ; and
hence all that is necessary in such a case fbr the record to contain is
enough to show whether the particular reason given for the exclusion is
sufficient or not: d.
